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NOTES AND COMMENT
THE APPLICATION OF THE PAROLE COMMISSION LAW AS AFFECTED
By PEOPLE V. THOMPSON.
In the recent interesting case of the People v. Robert Thompson'
decided in July of this year, we find a construction of Section 4 of the
Parole Commission Law 2 which arrests attention.3 The defendant
therein had been convicted, upon sufficient evidence, of the crime of
illegally practicing medicine as defined by the Education Law 4 and
sentenced to imprisonment for one year in the New York County
Penitentiary. Three days later, the Trial Court, having reconsidered
the sentence and apparently arriving at the conclusion that it was
erroneous, on its own motion recalled the defendant. They then re-
committed him to the penitentiary for an indeterminate time, over his
objection, in accordance with the provisions of Section 4 of the
Parole Commission Law. The basis of the defendant's objection was
the practical effect of the second sentence, which might cause his
confinement to continue for three years, instead of the one year pre-
scribed by the statute defining the crime.
The salient clauses of Section 4 5 first exclude those: (1) who
have been committed in default of payment of a fine imposed, (2)
who have been committed for failure to furnish sureties upon a con-
viction of disorderly conduct, or abandonment, and (3) who are not
insane or mentally or physically incapable of reformation and provide
that certain classes of offenders, except those enumerated above, "shall
if sentenced to any institution under the jurisdiction of the depart-
ment of correction in said city (of the first class) be committed * * *
under the jurisdiction of said department of correction." It then
provides for the method of determination of sentence, and the max-
imum period of incarceration, which is three years. Undoubtedly
Section 4 includes within its scope those not insane, and who are
1251 N. Y. 428, 167 N. E. 575 (1929).
'Laws of 1915, c. 579.
'Although the Parole Commission Law has been in force since May 10,
1925, it is interesting that no cases under Section 4 have come up for review by
the Court of Appeals before this.
' Laws of 1927, c. 85.
'Supra Note 2, Sec. 4 (as amended by Laws of 1916, c. 287): "After the
creation of a parole commission in any of the said cities as hereinbefore pro-
vided, any person convicted of any crime or offense for which the court may
sentence to a penitentiary, workhouse, city prison, county jail or other institution
under the jurisdiction of the department of correction of said city, who shall not
be committed in default of payment of a fine imposed, or for failure to furnish
surety or sureties upon a conviction of disorderly conduct tending to a breach
of the peace or of abandonment, and who is not insane or mentally or physically
incapable of being substantially benefited by the correctional and reformatory
purposes of any such institution under the jurisdiction of the department of
correction in said city, be sentenced and committed to a penitentiary or a work-
house or a reformatory under the jurisdiction of the said department of
correction. * * * The term of imprisonment of any person sentenced to any such
penitentiary shall not be fixed or limited by the court in imposing sentence.
The term of imprisonment * * * shall not exceed three years. * * *"
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capable of reformation, as the Court in the case of People ex rel.
Kipnis v. McCann points out:
"The plain purpose of the Parole Commission Act is to
give every person who has been convicted of a crime in the
cities of the first class, punishable by imprisonment in the
places specified in the act, an opportunity to benefit by the
disciplinary, correctional and reformatory purposes of the in-
stitutions under the jurisdiction of the department of correc-
tion, unless the Trial Court deems the offender mentally or
physically incapable of being substantially benefited thereby." 6
Whether the defendant is insane or mentally or physically in-
capable of reformation is a question for the Court to decide before it
imposes sentence.7 The statute does not require the decision to be
expressly stated and, evidently, it is to be implied from the nature
of the sentence. In the absence of a finding that he is so incapable it
is "bound to apply the provisions relating to parole as embodied in
the later statute." 8
This the Court concedes:
"Indeed, we are unanimous that the provisions of that
law are mandatory in the cities in which the Parole Commis-
sion Law applies, whenever the defendant 'is not insane or
mentally or physically incapable of being substantially ben-
efited by the correctional and reformatory purposes' of the
institution to which he is committed." 9
Admitting this, it is striking that the Court holds the first sen-
tence to be valid. It bases its decision ostensibly on the theory that
the finding regarding the prisoner's capacity is implicit in the sentence
-if the sentence is for a fixed term, a finding that he is incapable of
benefit therefrom. But it holds further, and this is its real reason, that
"To require the Court to state expressly that it has deter-
mined the question which must be the basis of the sentence
imposed would * * * result in the creation of new technicalities
in the administration of the criminal law." 10
By "technicalities" the Court evidently means the imposition of new
duties upon the Trial Court, not embodied in the statute. This is
perhaps true. But is not the Court indulging in a greater technicality?
'199 App. Div. 30, 38, 191 N. Y. Supp. 574, 579 (1922), aff'd 234 N. Y. 502,
no opinion (italics ours).
7 Supra Note 1 at 431.
8Ibid. 433 (O'Brien, J., in his dissenting opinion).
'Ibid. 430 (prevailing opinion) (italics ours).0Ibid. 432.
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To conclude that the Trial Court impliedly found this defendant in-
capable of reformation by its first sentence, in the very face of its
second sentence, passed three days later, is an obvious fiction, in itself
a technicality of the highest order.
Although even then the Trial Court made no express finding,
certainly from its action it can be inferred that it found this defendant
capable of the reformation which the Legislature hoped to effect.
Surely it rebuts any presumption that the Court has duly performed
its judicial duty to pass upon the question of the defendant's capacity
for benefit 11 and has found him incapable. As Judge O'Brien says
in his dissenting opinion, referring to the members of the Trial
Court who resentenced the defendant:
"Never did one of them, never did counsel, reveal any
indication of an indulgence in the impossible presumption that
defendant was insane or was beyond the hope of correction.
All took for granted that he was not abnormal and, upon that
assumption, they directed their attention solely to a considera-
tion of the statute applicable to his case."
The Court saw its error and hastened to correct it. By so doing, it
proclaimed its finding in regard thereto more plainly than in words.
The Court of Appeals must have had cognizance of this, and yet it
chooses to treat this defendant as if he were incapable of reformation
in fact. If this statute affected only those in the first category-the
insane-what would be the effect of this decision? A sane man, com-
mitted to an asylum on a technicality, by a court professedly seeking
to avoid technicalities.
That the Legislature intended to extend the reformatory and
correctional functions of penal institutions is clearly expressed in the
enacting clause 12 of the Parole Commission Law. What seems to
have been the very first attempt to apply the principle of indeterminate
sentence was in 1824, when a law of this state provided for a New
York House of Refuge for juveniles alone. Not until 1910, however,
was there any widespread agitation to apply the principle to adult
offenders. Since then almost half of the states of the Union have
enacted laws embodying the principles of parole and indeterminate
sentence, which go hand in hand.' 3 But other reformatory measures
had been passed, in some slight recognition of the theories of criminol-
ogists and penologists in Europe and America. These men and
Ibid. 434 (dissenting opinion).
' Supra Note 2: "An act extending and developing the reformatory and
correctional functions of workhouses, penitentiaries and reformatories under
the jurisdiction of departments of correction in cities of the first class, providing
for the sentence, commitment, parole, conditional discharge and reapprehension
of persons committed to such institutions and for the establishment of a parole
commission in such cities." (Italics ours.)
Barnes, The Repression of Crime, pp. 220-221 et seq.
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women were striving to educate the public away from regarding
criminals as "perverse moral free agents," 14 only to be punished and
avenged by society, and urging intelligent treatment leading to reform
as well. Before 1915 some efforts in this direction had been made,
notably in the reformatory legislation for women, beginning in- 1881.15
Not only the Legislature but the Judiciary were beginning to recog-
nize the merit of such procedure. Judge Burr, writing of one such
reformatory measure 1 6 in the People ex rel. St. Clair v. Davis,1" says:
"The tendency of modern legislation is, so long as there
is hope of reformation, to reform as well as to punish offend-
ers. * * * Legislation which has for its object * * * moral
reformation, is wholesome in its character, and the courts
should be reluctant to thwart or impede its efficiency." 18
This tendency has been extended to include other classes of
'offenders as wel, in the Parole Commission Law. The adoption of
this law has been a far stride forward in the long, slow process of
directing the trend of ideas of the public, with resulting action by
the Legislature, into the channels leading to the scientific treatment
of criminals. In writing of this law, Mr. Justice Greenbaum 19 says:
"The Parole Commission is the result of a progressive
and humanitarian movement designed to benefit the prisoner
and society. * * * It aims by humane and sympathetic treat-
ment to elevate the standards of the criminal, giving due heed
to his mental and moral deficiencies and thereby to lessen
criminality 20 in the community."
Whether or not this is the wisest method of effecting the object of the
Legislature is not the question before us. Although furthering its
purpose and faithfully carrying out its provision, the Court may not
be convinced of its wisdom. Mr. Justice Greenbaum goes on to say:
"Ibid. 155.
'Laws of 1881, c. 187; Laws of 1887, c. 17; Laws of 1890, c. 238; Laws of
1892, c. 704; Laws of 1896, c. 54 (Gen. Laws, c. 26) ; Laws of 1909, c. 57 (N. Y.
Ann. Cons. Laws, c 55 Sec. 226).
" Laws of 1905, c. 610 Sec. 707-a, which provides that: "Whenever a womanbetween the ages of sixteen and thirty is convicted in the City of New York of
habitual drunkenness, of being a common prostitute * * * she may be com-
mitted to the State Reformatory for Women at Bedford, pursuant to the
provisions of Sec. 146 of the State Charities Law, to be there confined subject
to the provisions of such laws and of any other statutes relating to such
reformatory."
" 143 App. Div. 579, 584, 127 N. Y. Supp. 1072, 1075 (1911).
"Ibid. 587, 127 N. Y. Supp. 1077.
" People ex rel. Hendrick v. Kernochan, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 28, 1916, aff'd
177 App. Div. 922, 164 N. Y. Supp. 1107 (1917), no opinion.
"Author's correction, original "criminology."
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"It may be that the human agencies engaged in such benefi-
cent work will at times fall short of what would be expected
of men and women intrusted with a most serious and delicate
task, but that is a matter that concerns the due administration
of the laws, and may well be left to the vigilance of the people
and the conscience of officials."
Nevertheless, this is the method adopted by the Legislature, and
sanctioned as far as it goes by the leading criminologists of the day.2 1
It is the function of courts to interpret and apply the laws of the
state. The lower courts have been singularly free from technicalities.
They have been quick to grasp the intention of the Legislature, and
have striven to apply it. In People v. Thompson the Court of Appeals
construed the Parole Commission Law, but did it apply it? It found
the provisions of the law mandatory in those cities in which it applies,
and yet its decision indicates a policy which deviates from that finding.
The likely effect of this decision is to influence trial courts in future
applications of this statute towards an exercise of a discretion in
their pronouncement of sentence, which the Court of Appeals admits
was not in the contemplation of the Legislature. Yet this might well
be deemed to be authorized, from the fact that the Court of Appeals
itself, in this case, held the defendant incapable of reformation in the
face of the finding of the Trial Court in its second determination that
he was to be considered a proper subject for the reforming agencies
with which the Parole Commission Law is concerned. It is difficult
to reconcile its policy, as we must interpret it from this case, with its
dicta as to the mandatory functions of the law. It is still more difficult
to understand why the Court of Appeals, even indirectly, should pro-
duce a reactionary effect on the legislative measures passed for the
advancement and benefit of society as a whole.
ESTHER L. KOPPELMAN.
FELONY MURDER AND THE JONES LAW.
The recent enactment of Congress, popularly known as the Jones
Law,' which has assumed much prominence in the press and public
'See Barnes, The Repression of Crime; Tannenbaum Frank, Wall
Shadows.
1 Public No. 899-70th Congress (S. 2901). An act to amend the National
Prohibition Act. as amended and supplemented: "Be it enacted by the Senate
and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress,
assembled, That wherever a penalty or penalties are prescribed in a criminal
prosecution by the National Prohibition Act, as amended and supplemented, for
the illegal manufacture, sale, transportation, importation, or exportation of
